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I. INTRODUCTION
RULES of procedure determine and reflect the transaction costs of op-
erating a legal system. An efficient procedural system is one that mini-
mizes the sum of the costs of erroneous judicial decisions and the costs
of operating the system.' However, the rules of procedure are formulated
by judges. If the self-interest of those judges conflicts with the efficiency
criterion, it would seem plausible that the judges will formulate proce-
dural rules that further their own interests rather than the interests of
efficiency.2
The prediction that judicial behavior is likely to conform to judges'
rational self-interest rather than to the interest of economic efficiency
appears to be particularly valid in the context of a discussion about proce-
dural rules. Such rules are not only construed by judges, they also are
promulgated under the direction of judges. The Advisory Committee on
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am extremely grateful for
the valuable comments I received from Kevin Clermont. The help he provided for this
article far exceeded the usual requirements of colleagueship. I also am very grateful for the
useful comments I received from Lewis Kornhauser, Geoffrey Miller, and Thomas Rowe.
Presented at the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Conference on "Economic
Analysis of Civil Procedure" at the University of Virginia School of Law, March 26-27,
1993.
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 549 (4th ed. 1992).
2 See, for example, Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior, or What's "Unconsti-
tutional" about the Sentencing Commission, 7 J. L. Econ. Org. 183, 184 (1991).
3 Congress delegated rule making in the area of civil procedure to the Supreme Court in
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). In 1958 Congress provided that
the Judicial Conference of the United States should monitor the rules of civil procedure
and recommend changes to the Supreme Court. The Judicial Conference established a
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and an Advisory Committee on
Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases. See Annual Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 6-7 (1958).
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Practice and Procedure in Civil Cases, which initiates revision of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is composed primarily of judges, with
a sprinkling of practicing lawyers and academics. The present member-
ship of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules includes two circuit
judges, four district judges, one U.S. magistrate, one state court judge,
a representative of the U.S. Department of Justice, two private lawyers,
and two law professors.4 The rules of procedure promulgated by this
advisory committee must be approved in final form by the Supreme
Court, after first being filtered through the Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure and the Judicial Conference of the United
States. To date, however, the Supreme Court has served as a mere con-
duit for the work of the advisory committee, approving the vast majority
of changes recommended to it by the committee.
Judicial rule making is not completely independent of legislative control
because amendments are subject to congressional oversight. But Con-
gress typically acquiesces in the promulgation of civil rules amendments.
Because procedural rules are designed to facilitate judicial administra-
tion, judges are given considerable leeway to craft such rules to conform
to their preferences.
Regardless of the motivations of the judges involved in crafting the
rules of procedure, it seems beyond dispute that the lawyers involved in
this process will have little to gain from minimizing the costs of the proce-
dural system. As Judge Ralph Winter has observed, "[I]mportant seg-
ments of the organized bar have little incentive to lessen the cost of
litigation by reducing the need for unnecessary legal services. Those who
seek to reform the [procedural rules of] discovery are unlikely ever to
find their proposals commanding enthusiastic support among the orga-
nized Bar." 5
It is surprising that the existing economic literature on the rules of
procedure uniformly has ignored the possibility of self-interest and in-
stead has presumed that judges exercise their considerable discretion to
formulate procedural rules that promote the goals of economic efficiency.
The lack of attention to self-interest is particularly surprising in light of
the fact that studies of particular procedural rules from an economic
perspective generally show that the rules do not produce results consis-
tent with economic efficiency.6
4 Randall Samborn, Committee Who's Who, Nat'l L. J., May 4, 1992, at 12.
5 Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 Brooklyn L. Rev. 263, 277
(1992).
6 Id. (arguing that existing pretrial discovery rules are inefficient); Geoffrey P. Miller,
An Economic Analysis of Rule 68, 15 J. Legal Stud. 93 (1986) (concluding that the rule is
ineffective in achieving its intended result of encouraging settlements and suggesting a more
efficient rule).
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Starting with the assumption that judges seek to maximize self-interest,
this article represents a preliminary attempt to develop a framework that
will generate useful predictions about the likely contours of procedural
rules. The article then compares the predictions generated by its model
of self-interested judicial behavior with existing procedural rules. While
the self-interest model developed here is not sufficiently well specified to
generate quantitative results that yield the possibility of rigorous empiri-
cal refutation, the competing public interest model is equally undevel-
oped. Useful comparisons between the existing approach model and the
public choice approach developed here, however, still can be made by
comparing qualitative descriptions of the effects of existing rules with the
predictions generated by these rival approaches.7
Having staked out a bold claim about the usefulness of the methodol-
ogy developed in this article, qualifications are in order. First, over a
wide range of issues, the self-interest model and the public interest model
of procedural rules will generate similar outcomes. It is only where the
self-interest of judges conflicts with the public interest in efficient judicial
administration that the differences between the two theories become im-
portant. Moreover, as developed more fully below, in certain contexts,
the two theories will converge because judges have an interest in efficient
administration. But, because judges do not fully internalize either the
costs of their own errors or the costs of an inefficient administration
of justice, judges' self-interest will conflict with efficiency values. It is
where such conflict exists that a theory of procedure built on judicial
self-interest has value.
Second, the theory of judicial self-interest discussed here does not
conflict with the theory that substantive common-law rules tend to be
more efficient than statutes or administrative law rules. Indeed, as will
be seen, the same self-interest that shapes procedural rules to reflect
judicial preferences also causes judges to generate efficient common-law
rules. In particular, judges can reduce their caseloads and eliminate dupli-
cative efforts by crafting clear rules where they are able. This, of course,
contributes to efficiency. Moreover, a judge can enhance his or her pres-
tige within the judiciary by fashioning creative, workable solutions to
existing legal problems. This too contributes to the efficiency of the legal
system.
This article begins with a general description of the likely preference
functions of judges and considers how these preferences might influence
the content of procedural rules. These observations are then compared
with existing procedural rules. It seems that such rules are best explained
with reference to judicial self-interest.
7 Posner, supra note 1, at 550.
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II. BUREAUCRATIC PREFERENCES: THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST
Any viable theory of judicial self-interest must account for the struc-
tural characteristics of the federal judiciary. Individual judges will have
widely varying preferences. Some will want to maximize leisure, some
will want to maximize their own prestige among some subgroup such as
lawyers, legal academics, or liberal or conservative groups. The same is
true of the individual members of Congress. Each group is composed of
individuals with widely varying preferences.8 What is generally ignored,
however, is that, like Congress, the judiciary is a bureaucracy with its
own set of institutional preferences. The rules of civil procedure are
designed to further this set of bureaucratic preferences.
The nature of the judiciary's bureaucratic preferences is defined by the
unique structural characteristics of the judiciary. In other words, while
judges cannot do much to change the basic features of the separation of
powers, judges can, and do, formulate the rules of procedure to give
themselves greater control over their own agendas. The bureaucratic
preferences of federal judges are informed by certain structural character-
istics. In particular, federal judges (1) have broad jurisdiction over a wide
variety of substantive areas of the law, (2) enjoy life tenure, (3) are paid
salaries that may not be reduced in nominal terms, (4) must justify their
decisions in the form of written opinions, and (5) are assigned cases at
random and cannot advance their preferences by preselecting the kinds
of cases that come before them. Moreover, judges' desire to control their
own agendas is heightened by the fact that, for most judges, there is a
considerable opportunity cost to serving on the judiciary because most
judges could be earning more in private practice. 9
In addition, judges inevitably will have made large, fixed human capital
investments in the form of their knowledge of existing law. This human
capital investment produces two sets of legal skills: one set is specific,
and the other generic. As used here, a judge's specific skills consist of
expertise in specialized areas of the law, such as securities regulation,
admiralty, or criminal procedure.1° A judge's generic legal skills consist
8 One judge has analyzed his profession "by treating judges as 'ordinary people' . . .
domesticate[d] . . . for economic analysis." See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does) 3 (Chicago L. and Econ. Work-
ing Paper No. 15, 2d Series, University of Chicago Law School, March 15, 1993).
9 Even those judges who were not earning more than their judicial salaries at the time
of their appointment could find higher-paying jobs in practice if they quit the bench and
joined a firm because of the prestige associated with being a former judge. For a discussion,
complete with formulas of the cost calculus involved in accepting a judgeship over private
practice, see id. at 24-31.
10 Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65
Chi. Kent L. Rev. 93, 95 (1989).
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of his expertise in areas of the law that are equally applicable across a
wide range of cases. For example, the ability to conduct legal research
is a generic legal skill; as is a detailed knowledge of the Rules of Evi-
dence, or the Rules of Civil Procedure. Each of these structural features
serves as a source for the distinct set of bureaucratic preferences that
inform judges' selection of procedural rules.
On the basis of these simple observations about the nature of the judi-
cial function, it is possible to develop three hypotheses about judicial
preferences. First, because judges have lifetime tenure, they are less
susceptible to the political pressures that affect the decisions of elected
officials.l" This makes judges more likely to further their own self-interest
by pursuing nonmonetary interests such as increasing leisure (reduction
in workload), discretionary power to select which cases to consider, in-
creased influence, and reputation within the legal community. 2 This ob-
servation is consistent with Richard Posner's view that "judges, like
other people, seek to maximize a utility function that includes both mone-
tary and nonmonetary elements (the latter including leisure, prestige, and
power)."' 3 As applied to the Rules of Civil Procedure, we would expect
judges to opt for those procedural rules that maximize their ability to
make discretionary decisions and those rules that enable a judge to make
such decisions quickly and with a minimum of outside interference. This
flexibility allows judges not only to maximize leisure but also to reach
legal results that maximize their own view of the good.
Second, judges' considerable human capital investment in the legal
system is likely to align their preferences with the preferences (and inter-
ests) of the legal community as a whole. Consequently, judges are likely
to view procedural rules that maximize the demand for lawyers' services
as socially desirable, not because of any cynical desire to pad the pockets
of members of the bar, but because of a tendency to see the benefits of
procedural rules but not the costs. This tendency is a result of the fact
that judges, like lawyers, internalize the benefits of procedural rules but
externalize the costs on clients and on society generally.
Finally, judges will try to maximize their ability to utilize their generic
legal skills. To the extent that procedural rules are generic rather than
1 Posner, supra note 8, at 4: "Article III of the Constitution erects such a high hurdle
to removing a federal judge from office that pretty much the only thing that will get him
removed is criminal activity."
12 For a judge, leisure can translate into better judging and greater income to judges
who pursue outside activities (depending on the type and extent of available moonlighting
opportunities). Id. at 27-28.
13 Posner, supra note 1, at 534. More recently, Posner has considered the "power"
element as worth ignoring since it only affects a "small minority [of judges]." Posner, supra
note 8, at 3.
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specialized, ceteris paribus, judges will attempt to maximize the range of
cases that can be discharged through procedural devices.
III. PROCEDURAL RULES AND JUDICIAL PREFERENCES
As noted above, a complete theory of how judicial preferences influ-
ence procedural rules must account for the structural features of the
judiciary. In particular, federal judges are by and large judges of general
jurisdiction. As such, a federal judge must decide cases involving a com-
plex mix of state and federal laws, ranging from admiralty to bankruptcy
to securities regulation.14 The task ofjudging has been made more difficult
over time because of the rapid expansion in the number and complexity
of federal statutes. 5 The explosion in statute making has made it impossi-
ble for federal judges to master the substantive rules of law in all of the
fields of law in which they must generate legal opinions. Procedural rules
can serve the self-interest of judges by permitting them to use procedural
grounds as a basis for deciding cases, thereby avoiding the necessity of
acquiring detailed specialized knowledge of substantive areas of law.
The theory developed here has an empirical component because one
would predict that an individual judge will be more likely to dispose of a
case on procedural or technical grounds where he lacks particularly
strong views or unique expertise in the substantive area of law at issue.
A judge who has invested considerable human capital in learning the
substantive law of securities regulation (because, for example, that was
his specialty in practice before becoming a judge) is less likely to dispose
of a case involving securities law issues on technical, procedural grounds.
Similarly, a judge with no expertise in admiralty will be more likely to
dispose of cases involving admiralty issues on procedural grounds than
those who have such expertise.
Thus, from the judges' perspective, procedural rules permit judges to
dispose of unwanted cases yet still allow them to utilize their substantive
knowledge in those areas in which they have particular expertise or inter-
est. This analysis is consistent with Frederick Schauer's observation that
the plain meaning rule is most often invoked when judges are called on
to decide cases involving what many perceive as uninteresting, highly
technical areas of the law such as the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act, social security, and taxation. Substantive legal reasoning,
14 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 660 (1992).
15 For descriptions of the magnitude and nature of the explosion in statute making at the
federal level, see Henry J. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 4 (1973); Guido
Calabresi, A Common Law For the Age of Statutes (1982).
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however, is invoked by judges to decide more interesting cases involving
such issues as flag burning, affirmative action, separation of powers, or
patronage. 16
Seen in this way, the rules of procedure serve as a substitute for other
generic legal rules, such as the canons of statutory construction or the
rule of stare decisis. All of these rules can be viewed as vehicles by
which judges can decide cases using generic legal rules that do not require
knowledge of the substantive legal issues involved in the underlying
dispute.
A. Dismissal
The most obvious way for a trial judge to invoke the rules of procedure
to dispose of a case that he does not wish to decide on the merits is by
simply dismissing the case as a matter of law for failure to state a claim.
For a variety of reasons, this is unlikely to be a very effective strategy
for trial judges seeking to maximize narrow self-interest. First, the fact
that one judge finds the legal issues in a particular case uninteresting does
not mean that other judges-including appellate judges-will find them
uninteresting. The rulings of federal trial judges are subject to review by
appellate panels of three judges. The availability of three-judge panels of
review makes it three times as likely that one of the appeals judges re-
viewing the case will find the substantive issue involved to be interesting.
This means that the probability of reversal for simple dismissals is likely
to be considered intolerably high for a trial judge. Judges will care about
reversal in this context for two reasons. First, judges have an interest in
avoiding being reversed because of the adverse reputational effect of a
reversal. 7 In addition, when a case is reversed on appeal it generally is
returned to the trial judge who originally ordered the dismissal. Conse-
quently, dismissal on the law, if reversed, will not permit the trial judge
to avoid hearing the case.
An additional reason why procedural rules are not likely to be used to
discharge cases on the law is that lawyers involved in drafting procedural
rules have a strong monetary interest in avoiding early dismissal. For
this reason, even "trivial or incremental" alterations in the procedural
rules that reduce the demand for lawyers' services are likely to "encoun-
ter enormous resistance."18
16 Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 S. Ct. Rev. 231, 247.
17 Posner, supra note 1, at 534.
18 Winter, supra note 5, at 263.
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B. Settlement
Most important, dismissing cases on the law is likely to be a rare occur-
rence because trial judges have a superior, low-cost alternative to such
dismissals: forcing settlements. Forcing settlements is superior to dis-
missing cases from the judiciary's perspective because it drastically re-
duces the probability of reversal. Forcing settlements is also superior to
dismissing cases from the perspective of the legal community. As Geof-
frey Miller has observed, because attorneys will have superior informa-
tion about the prospects for success for a case than their clients, the
power over the settlement decision generally will be shared by the lawyer
and the client. Lawyers can be expected to shade their legal advice re-
garding settlement to suit their own interests. 9 Knowing this, judges can
buy the cooperation of the legal community in their efforts to obtain
settlements by conducting settlement negotiations in such a way that it
is in the economic interests of lawyers to encourage their clients to settle.
Interestingly, while judges who dismiss cases on the law risk tarnishing
their reputations, judges actually can enhance their reputations by devis-
ing "innovative" or "creative" settlements. For example, Rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a trial judge to direct the attor-
neys for the parties to appear at a pretrial conference for the purpose of
"facilitating the settlement of the case." 20 But judges can invoke Rule 16
simply to rid a case of what they regard as frivolous or uninteresting
issues of fact and law, whether or not requested by one of the parties.21
Moreover, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
would have amended Rule 16 to authorize courts to require not only
lawyers but also the parties or their insurers or both to attend settlement
conferences and to participate in alternative dispute resolution proce-
dures designed to foster settlement. Lawyers objected to this proposal,
claiming that "explicit authority to require party attendance at settlement
conferences would be misused by judges to coerce settlements.- 22 Con-
sistent with Miller's analysis of the agency problems involved in settle-
ment, it is notable that the lawyers did not object to judges coercing
19 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. Legal Stud. 189,
214 (1987).
20 F.R.C.P. 16(a)(5).
2 F.R.C.P. 16(c)(1) provides for pretrial conferences to include "the formulation and
simplification of the issues, including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses." The
Advisory Committee Notes (1983) say this rule "confirm[s] the court's power to identify...
the real issues prior to trial, thereby saving time and expense for everyone."
22 Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Letter to Hon.
Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
May 1, 1992, Attachment B, page 6.
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settlements without the clients being present. They only objected to hav-
ing clients present to observe the discussions of the division of gains
from settlement. Put another way, if there were no agency costs in the
attorney-client relationship, there would be no reason for lawyers to ob-
ject to settlement discussions at which the clients would appear. As a
compromise between the judicial interests in coercing settlements and
the bar's interests in controlling settlement negotiations, it was agreed
that party representatives would be made accessible by telephone during
settlement negotiations with the court. Moreover, the proposed amend-
ments to Rule 16 do not deter judges from exercising their inherent pow-
ers to compel parties to attend pretrial conferences or to participate in
alternative dispute resolution procedures.
C. Rule 68: Discovery and Automatic Disclosure
As noted above, judges are likely to use the rules of procedure to
increase their control over litigation. Judges control litigation by retaining
the power to dispose of unwanted cases by coercing settlements and by
expanding their ability to dismiss cases without reference to the underly-
ing substantive legal issues. In addition, building on the assumption that
judges care about prestige and prefer important cases to trivial cases, we
can expect procedural rules designed to raise the fixed costs of litigation
in order to weed out small cases.
Under Rule 68, for example, a plaintiff who refuses a settlement offer,
goes to trial, and obtains a judgment that is less favorable than the de-
fending party's offer must pay all of the defendant's postoffer costs. Such
a rule is best viewed as a mechanism for reducing the incidence of small-
stakes litigation, rather than as a mechanism for encouraging settlement.
As Miller has observed, the popular justification for Rule 68, namely that
the rule encourages settlements, is fallacious because it ignores the fact
that defendants faced with Rule 68 simply will lower their settlement
offers to plaintiffs.23 This, in turn, will not so much encourage settlement
as drive down the level of settlement offers.
The costs that courts may assess against plaintiffs choosing not to
accept an offer of settlement under Rule 68 generally do not include
attorneys' fees, but only fixed costs such as filing fees and the cost of
deposition transcripts.24 Consequently, the real effect of Rule 68 is to
lower the expected value of cases to plaintiffs by raising the expected
23 Miller, supra note 6, at 94.
24 This general rule does not apply where the applicable substantive statute includes
attorneys' fees as part of costs. Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).
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costs. But because the costs affected by Rule 68 are fixed costs, plaintiffs'
incentives to bring small cases will be affected disproportionately. Thus
Rule 68 not only shifts wealth from plaintiffs to defendants, it also in-
creases the utility of certain judges because lawyers will not be able to
justify bringing a case with Rule 68 in place that they might bring without
it. This reduced volume of cases will provide judges more leisure time
and a docket of more significant cases. Cases that might be brought in
the absence of Rule 68 will not be brought with the rule in place.
Recent analysis of Rule 68 reinforces the argument that the peculiar
design of this rule can best be explained as a mechanism for maximizing
judicial utility, rather than for maximizing the efficiency of the legal sys-
tem. In a recent study, Kathryn Spier has shown that Rule 68 will tend
to increase the likelihood of settlement where the litigants disagree about
damages but agree about liability. In constrast, when the litigants disagree
about liability, but agree about damages, Rule 68 will tend to decrease
the likelihood of settlement. This corresponds with the basic intuition
that lawyers and judges will find liability (that is, legal) issues more inter-
esting than damages issues, which generally revolve around such nonlegal
issues as the plaintiff's expected future earnings.25
The above arguments about Rule 68 apply with even greater force to
the liberal rules for discovery. Under modern discovery rules, litigants
can select whatever discovery tools they wish-interrogatories, deposi-
tions, document requests-and can conduct free-form investigations of
their opponents' records without regard for the particularities of the
pleadings or the precise nature of their positions.26 The liberal rules of
pretrial discovery involve "considerable to enormous waste." 27 In par-
ticular, "a no-stone-left-unturned (sometimes a no-grain-of-sand-left-
unturned) philosophy of discovery governs much litigation and imposes
costs, usually without corresponding benefits. Costly discovery under-
taken with only a marginal effect on the outcome of litigation constitutes
an economic loss to society. Like any wasteful practice, it uses up re-
sources that could be put to more productive uses."28
25 Kathryn E. Spier, Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-shifting Rules, 25 RAND
J. Econ. (1994, in press).
26 Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescribing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure Require-
ment of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 Rev. Litigation
77, 85 (1992).
27 Winter, supra note 5, at 263.
28 Id. at 264. As Deborah Rhode has observed, lawyers engage in a great deal of discov-
ery. In her words, lawyers leave "no stone unturned, provided, of course, they can charge
by the stone." See Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589,
635 (1985).
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Perhaps the most common explanation for the survival of the patently
inefficient rules of discovery is that they benefit lawyers at the expense
of clients. Litigants become the victims of their lawyers' self-interest.
The argument is that lawyers profit from more discovery because often
they are paid by the hour and thus benefit both from more discovery as
well as more litigation about discovery.29 While this analysis has some
explanatory power, it is not a complete explanation of the existence of
liberal discovery because it ignores the fact that there are costs as well
as benefits to lawyers from such rules. In particular, from the lawyers'
perspective, liberal discovery rules increase the fees garnered in individ-
ual cases, but they decrease the overall demand for legal services by
driving up the price of such services. Thus, plaintiffs' lawyers will be
less able to convince prospective clients to file lawsuits because such
clients will be aware of the enormous cost of discovery. Even those who
explain liberal discovery rules on the basis of the divergence of interest
between lawyers and clients acknowledge that "discovery is sometimes
used as a club against the other party. Unlimited discovery allows a
party to impose costs on an adversary solely to increase the adversary's
expenses. The anticipation that bringing or defending a lawsuit will be
costly, regardless of the merits, may cause a party with a meritorious
claim or defense not to sue, to give up early, or to settle for an amount
less than defense costs."
3°
Similarly, one would predict that market forces would emerge to miti-
gate the agency cost problems that exist between lawyers and their cli-
ents. And they have. In recent years corporate inside counsel has become
more active in monitoring outside legal services. An entire cottage indus-
try of consulting firms who specialize in auditing legal bills has emerged
as well. 3 These developments can be expected to reduce lawyers' de-
mand for open-ended discovery, and one would predict that these devel-
opments would lead lawyers to respond by voluntarily reducing the costli-
ness of discovery.
Thus, it is hard to conclude that a rule that raises the marginal costs
of bringing lawsuits unambiguously benefits lawyers. It is clear, however,
that such rules benefit judges in two ways. First, the liberal rules of
discovery reduce total litigation, thereby reducing judges' overall case-
loads. Second, liberal discovery rules constitute fixed costs for bringing
litigation because there is no legal rule that reduces strategic behavior by
2 Winter, supra note 5, at 277.
30 Id. at 277.
31 David P. Land, Reasonableness and Auditing Legal Fees, N.Y. L. J., February 25,
1993, at 5.
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lawyers by limiting the extent of the discovery available in small stakes
litigation. 32 Consequently, the liberal rules of discovery may have a dis-
proportionate impact on small stakes litigation because discovery will
constitute a higher percentage of the total expected recovery in such
litigation.
Of course, the parties requesting discovery bear some of the costs
associated with their discovery requests. We would therefore expect less
discovery in small stakes litigation because clients will only be willing to
incur litigation costs up to the amount of any expected recovery. Cases
with small expected recoveries will not justify elaborate discovery re-
quests. Consistent with this analysis, a study by the Federal Judicial
Center showed that recovery requests were recorded with the district
court in fewer than one-half of the 3,114 cases studied. In the majority
of cases there were no discovery requests at all.33 Other studies show
that in 95 percent of cases, there are fewer than five discovery requests
made.34 Nonetheless, abuse of the discovery process is well documented,
and it can be used to coerce settlements and to reduce the incidence of
litigation, particularly small stakes litigation.35 However, given the rather
limited use of discovery in small stakes litigation, self-interested judges
might try to develop another mechanism for reducing the percentage of
their caseloads composed of such litigation.
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure re-
cently recommended that courts be permitted to limit discovery where
"the burden or expense of the proposed discovery rule outweighs its
likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, and the importance of the proposed
discovery in resolving issues. "36 This new rule does not alter the existing
equilibrium at all. Under the current rules, judges can limit discovery
where such discovery will be unduly burdensome.37 As before, under the
32 F.R.C.P. 26(b)(1)(iii) does, however, permit a judge to limit discovery where it will be
"unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount
in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation." Of course, a judge is free to decline to invoke this rule when he
wants to coerce a settlement.
33 David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 72, 90
(1983).
31 Paul R. Connolly, Edith A. Holleman, & Michael J. Kuhlman, Judicial Controls and
the Civil Litigative Process: Discovery (1978).
35 Winter, supra note 5 (discussing how discovery can be used as a "club" to coerce
settlements).
36 Proposed F.R.C.P. 26(b)(2)(iii). Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, Submitted to Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure By Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, May, 1992.
37 See note 32 supra.
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proposed rule, judges benefit because they can control discovery. Judges
can permit broad discovery when they want to raise litigation costs and
encourage early settlement. At the same time, lawyers can increase the
supply of litigation by making a credible claim to clients that litigation
costs can be reduced by limiting discovery.
More important, a proposed amendment to Rule 26 would require in
every case automatic disclosure of certain core information including the
names and addresses of witnesses and the location and categories of
documents "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings. ' 38 Critics of the proposed rule within the legal community
argued that it would produce more confusion, delay, and expense than
existing discovery rules because attorneys would be free to manipulate
the standard without fear of penalty.3 9 The legal community also argued
that the rule would assist plaintiffs by requiring defense counsel to re-
spond to every legal theory that might support the plaintiff's complaint,
including theories the plaintiffs had not considered.'
This proposed rule would reduce judicial workloads by reducing the
incentives of lawyers to bring small stakes litigation in two ways. First,
small stakes cases would be deterred because the rule would impose yet
another fixed cost on the litigation process. Second, and more important,
this proposed rule would require document production in every case,
including the 50 percent of cases in which there was no document produc-
tion at all prior to the implementation of the rule. As such, the proposed
amendment to Rule 26 will have a disproportionate effect on small stakes
litigation by requiring the production of documents that would not have
been produced in the absence of such a rule.4 Ironically, a set of rule
changes ostensibly designed to streamline the discovery process will re-
sult in even more document production than before. It is not surprising
that many practitioners believe that the proposals for discovery reform
reflect an outcome in which lawyers' interests are being "sacrificed to
the judicial agenda [of reducing the workload of the courts] without any
airing of the issues. "42
D. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council
Perhaps the most striking example of the judiciary's efforts to claim
control of their own agendas is reflected in Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natu-
38 Proposed F.R.C.P. 26(a).
31 Mayer, supra note 26, at 113.
o Winter, supra note 5, at 267.
41 1 am grateful to my colleague Kevin Clermont for this point.
42 Laura A. Kaster & Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, Nat'l
L. J., August 17, 1992, at 15.
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ral Resources Defense Council, Inc.4 3 Chevron involved the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency's (EPA) "bubble" policy, which contained a new
way to measure discharges of industrial pollution controlled by the Clean
Air Act. The EPA's new policy gave the agency the discretion to define
the statutory term "stationary source" to mean either any polluting de-
vice within a plant or an entire manufacturing plant. In some states this
interpretation had the effect of reducing manufacturers' costs of comply-
ing with the Clean Air Act.
At issue in Chevron was whether the EPA's new definition of "station-
ary source" violated the Clean Air Act. But the opinion contained sweep-
ing language on the need for courts to defer to administrative agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, including statutes on subjects far
removed from the Clean Air Act. In what has been described as one of
the "defining cases in the last twenty years of American public law," '
the Court held that an administrative agency's construction of a statute
would be upheld unless it is unreasonable or otherwise impermissible.45
This case has been severely criticized as "a striking abdication of judicial
responsibility" and "quite incompatible with Marshall's aphorism that
'[it is emphatically the province of the judicial department to say what
the law is.' "46 The criticism of Chevron is based on the fact that the
decision creates enormous possibilities for judicial abdication to agency
decisions.
From the perspective of the self-interest of the judiciary, however,
Chevron must be viewed as an act of genius. The opinion increases dra-
matically the ability of judges to control their own agendas. As the Court
in Chevron made clear, courts may draw on "traditional tools of [statu-
tory] construction" when evaluating agency interpretations of statutes.
In this respect, judges may defer to agencies when they want to. Alterna-
tively, whenever ajudge thinks that an agency's interpretation of a statute
contradicts the plain meaning of the law, the overall structure of a statu-
tory scheme, the relevant legislative history, or even the underlying pur-
poses of a statute, he is free to ignore Chevron's call for deference and
overrule the agency.47
43 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2071,
2075 (1990).
45 Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, at 843-845.
46 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
Duke L. J. 511, 513-14 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
47 Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War
over Administrative Agencies, 80 Georgetown L. J. 671, 681 (1992).
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The decision in Chevron allows federal judges to invoke a generic pro-
cedural value-deference to the expertise of administrative agencies-
whenever they wish to avoid considering the merits of an agency ruling.
In constrast, the ruling in Chevron is sufficiently flexible that judges who
have developed a specialty in a particular area, or have strong prefer-
ences about the outcome of a particular case, are completely free to
ignore the agency's interpretation.48 Thus the Court's ruling in Chevron
allows judges simultaneously to take full advantage of any specific human
capital investments they have made in learning particular areas of the
law and to decide other cases on the basis of generic legal skills. No
judge will have the expertise, or the inclination, to handle all of the areas
of substantive law that come before him.
Similarly, Chevron also serves the interests of judges who want to
minimize the time and effort involved in judging. After Chevron one
would expect that those judges with particularly strong tastes for leisure
would invoke the Chevron invitation simply to defer to agency expertise.
Those judges, however, with more ambition, or conviction, or with a
stronger agenda are free to ignore the determinations of administrative
agencies when they so choose.
IV. PROCEDURAL RULES, JUDICIAL PREFERENCES, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Although the theory developed in this article is based on judicial self-
interest, the theory is descriptive rather than normative. Nothing in the
theory would suggest that judges acting in their own self-interest will
craft rules that are systematically inefficient.
By contrast, over a wide range of issues, the judiciary's influence on
the development of procedural rules will move such rules in the direction
of clients' and society's interest by offsetting the influence that lawyers
have on the development of the law. For example, as noted above,
judges' ability to streamline the discovery process will mitigate the
agency-cost problem that exists between lawyers and their clients. Simi-
larly, judges' power to force settlements on lawyers will benefit some
clients by reducing the ability of lawyers to prolong litigation in order to
amass more billable hours.
As well, the use of procedural rules to discharge cases on the basis of
generic legal skills may be efficient because it reduces the cost to judges
of specializing in certain areas of law. Because judges can dispose of a
wide range of cases on the basis of generic legal skills, the opportunity
48 Sunstein, supra note 44, at 2092 (whenever a court "has a firm conviction that the
agency interpretation violates the statute, that interpretation must fail").
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cost of specializing in one area of the law is reduced. Thus, even judges
of general jurisdiction can retain their specialties in particular areas of
the law by disposing of cases in areas they know nothing about by forcing
settlements or by invoking a decision rule such as one of the canons of
statutory construction, or the rule of stare decisis, or some other proce-
dural device that involves the application of a generic legal skill.
It would be wrong to view the impact of judicial self-interest on proce-
dural rules as providing only benefits and no costs. The preceding analy-
sis suggests that judicial self-interest causes some inefficiencies in the
litigation process. For example, it appears likely that judges' tastes for
leisure cause them to raise the costs of litigation above the socially opti-
mal level. Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with
the high fixed costs of discovery rules, move the threshold point at which
the expected benefits of bringing a lawsuit are outweighed by the costs,
particularly for small stakes claims, to inefficient levels. Similarly, litiga-
tion produces a public good in the form of legal precedent. Legal prece-
dents are of general social value because they lower the transaction costs
of doing business. Judges' self-interest leads them to craft procedural
rules that reduce the percentage of cases ultimately resolved on the mer-
its. Because more cases are resolved on technical, procedural grounds,
the available supply of precedents is adversely affected by judicial self-
interest.
Finally, to the extent that the procedural rules allow judges to obtain
settlements in cases that would not otherwise be settled and to discharge
cases on purely procedural grounds, the risk that judges will decide cases
willfully (that is, on the basis of their own narrow preferences without
regard to efficiency norms, or precedent, or other neutral principles) goes
up. This is because when a judge is able to coerce a settlement or to
discharge a case from his docket on purely procedural grounds, he avoids
the general requirement that judges justify their decisions on the basis of
a formal, written opinion.
The nature of judicial preferences also can help explain why judges
have not gone further in pressing for changes that would reduce caseload
growth. Perhaps the best-known suggestion for dealing with the explosion
in judges caseloads is the proposal to establish a new federal appellate
court that would serve as a buffer between the courts of appeal and the
Supreme Court. As Posner has pointed out, the creation of intermediate
appellate courts, by making the judicial system more hierarchical, would
respond effectively to caseload growth.49 In fact it was the problem of
Posner, supra note 1, at 580.
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caseload growth that led most states, as well as the federal authorities,
to create an intermediate appellate court between the trial court and the
supreme court.5 ° However, the creation of such a court would benefit the
Supreme Court at the expense of the federal appellate courts, by reducing
the caseload of the Supreme Court and the prestige of the lower federal
courts of appeal. For this reason, the proposal to create a new appellate
court just below the Supreme Court has been vigorously opposed by
appellate court judges.
Similarly, it is interesting that Congress has responded to the federal
courts' caseload problem, not by imposing higher filing fees, but instead
by setting and raising minimum threshold levels for bringing lawsuits.
The efficient solution to the caseload problem would be to impose filing
fees. " A minimum amount in controversy requirement is the equivalent
to setting an infinite fee for cases below the minimum and a zero fee for
cases above the level. However, no one actually collects such a fee. By
contrast, a fixed fee imposes what is, in effect, a proportionally declining
tax on lawsuits, thereby causing litigants to internalize the costs of using
the court system.5 ' The minimum amount in controversy requirement
used in the federal court system is inefficient compared to a filing fee
system because the requirement subsidizes litigation. If a case meets the
minimum requirements, the litigants do not have to contribute to the
costs of the judicial system. 3 However, judges are likely to prefer a
minimum amount in controversy requirement because such requirements
operate as a fixed cost on litigation, ensuring that small claims disfavored
by judges will not be brought.
V. TURNING SUBSTANTIVE RULES INTO PROCEDURAL RULES:
LESSONS FROM CORPORATE LAW
Judges will tend to decide cases in ways that allow them to take advan-
tage of their own skills and expertise. For example, while judges generally
have little, if any, expertise in statistics or economics or finance, they
have significant expertise in existing procedural norms. Consequently,
while a judge is unlikely to be able to evaluate the substantive terms of
a particular transaction, or to determine whether a particular price is fair,
he will be able to evaluate whether a preexisting set of procedural rules
have been followed by litigants. Judges who wish to expedite the disposi-
50 Id.
"' Id. at 581.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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tion of cases will replace substantive law analysis with procedural rules.5 4
Judges will not only invoke procedural rules to dismiss cases, they also
will transform substantive rules of law into procedural rules. Thus, judges
are likely to establish substantive legal rules that are, in effect, proce-
dural.
For example, in Smith v. W. Van Gorkom55 the shareholders of Trans
Union Corporation filed a class-action lawsuit against the firm's board of
directors, seeking to set aside a merger between Trans Union and a
wholly owned subsidiary of Marmon Group, Incorporated. This merger
allowed the plaintiffs to realize a profit of more than 50 percent on the
premerger price of their stock. The Delaware supreme court decided that
the Trans Union directors had acted in a grossly negligent manner in
approving the merger proposal because they had not developed an ade-
quate procedural framework for analyzing the proposal.
What is remarkable about the opinion is that despite the imposition of
draconian damages on the individual directors who were defendants, the
remedy prescribed was "purely a nostrum" 56 because "corporate manag-
ers faced with a situation like that confronting the Trans Union board
can insure against liability by demonstrating that the board has engaged
in due deliberations.- 57 In other words, corporate directors can engage
in virtually any transaction they wish, without fear of challenge, simply
by creating the procedural appearance of fairness. Lawyers create the
appearance of fairness by ensuring that the corporate minutes reflect
lengthy and thorough discussions of the proposed transactions and by
providing the decision makers with all relevant documents. Of course,
these procedures, while costly, "do not provide any reliable guarantee
that the transaction will benefit shareholders." 58 What these transactions
do accomplish is to allow judges to focus their decision making on issues
with which they are comfortable.
Commentators have observed that these sorts of rules amount to a tax
on corporate control transactions. This tax benefits both lawyers and
judges. It benefits lawyers by increasing the demand for their services,
and it benefits judges by allowing them to substitute a generalized judicial
inquiry into the procedures used in a particular transaction, for the diffi-
cult and fact-intensive analysis that otherwise would be required.
Perhaps the best example of the judiciary's efforts to substitute proce-
5' Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., January 1993, at
52.
55 Smith v. W. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858 (Del. 1985).
56 Macey and Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 Yale L. J. 127, 134 (1988).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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dural rules for substantive rules of law lies in the corporate law rules
regarding valuation issues. Despite the fact that sophisticated techniques
of corporate finance have made valuation much more objective than ever
before, courts consistently have emphasized that procedural rules are
more important than substantive legal rules. For example, in Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc.,59 the Delaware supreme court decided that the procedures
followed by a board of directors in evaluating the price paid by a majority
shareholder for a corporation under its control was insufficient, even
when the shares of the corporation being purchased were publicly traded
and the price paid represented a 50 percent premium over the market
price of the subsidiary's shares. Weinberger involved the purchase by
Signal Corporation of shares in UOP, whose stock was traded on the
New York Stock Exchange. Signal, which owned 50.5 percent of UOP's
stock, wanted to increase its ownership to 100 percent. In evaluating the
fairness of the transaction, the court made it clear that the preoffer market
price of UOP was of less importance than the procedures established by
Signal for arriving at the price.' The rule established in Weinberger has
resulted in a new set of procedures in cash-out merger transactions that
increase the cost of consummating such transactions, without any appar-
ent benefit to the minority shareholders. The result in Weinberger can
best be explained as an effort to transform substantive legal issues that
judges find difficult to master into procedural rules that are easy forjudges
to administer.
Indeed, under existing corporate law, virtually any transaction can be
insulated from legal challenge if a sufficient procedural framework is es-
tablished and followed. It is impossible to justify the systematic "proce-
duralization" of substantive corporate law rules without taking account
of the judges' preference for procedural over substantive rules.
VI. CONCLUSION
Judges sometimes are heard to complain about their ever-increasing
caseloads. 6' The preceding analysis demonstrates that, while such com-
plaints may be useful in allowing judges to extract more resources from
Congress,62 these complaints may be exaggerated, particularly given that
" 457 A.2d 701 (1983).
60 Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A2d, at 708-12.
6' Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, 65, 80 (1985); Reinhardt,
supra note 54, at 52.
62 On average, each new federal judgeship is estimated to cost more than $1 million
annually for salaries, staff, and other expenses. See Stephen A. Labaton, Clinton May Use
Diversity Pledge to Remake Courts, N.Y. Times, March 8, 1993, at Al, B9.
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elected officials have strong incentives to expand the number of federal
judgeships .63
Judges have considerable ability to control their own agendas by craft-
ing decision rules that allow judges to dispose of cases quickly and
cheaply. These rules also enable judges to winnow out undesirable, small
stakes litigation and to devote more energy to cases in which they are
interested and less energy to cases that are of little entertainment value.
Of course, judges have not captured the rule-making process completely.
Lawyers and other interest groups, such as court reporters, insurance
companies, and other large consumers of judicial services, inevitably in-
fluence the process. But as the above discussion has shown, the ability
of the federal judiciary to control the process by which the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure are revised gives them a distinct advantage over com-
peting interest groups in obtaining procedural rules that reflect their own
bureaucratic self-interest.
63 Moreover, the president and Congress have incentives to create more federal judge-
ships in order to provide "more ways for senators [and presidents] to reward loyal support-
ers," while simultaneously claiming to devote more resources to fighting crime. See id.
at B9.
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